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LOCKED,  LOADED,  AND  REGISTERED:
THE  FEASIBILITY  AND  CONSTITUTIONALITY




The federal government has long been hostile to the very notion of a
gun registration policy.  Aside from a spattering of narrow twentieth-century
statutes,1 Congress has had nothing to say about such a policy—or at least
nothing nice to say.  One law specifically barred agencies from implementing
“any system of registration of firearms, firearms owners, or firearms transac-
tions or dispositions,”2 and another forbade any “department, agency,
officer, or employee of the United States” from using the National Instant
Criminal Background Check System (“NICS”) to establish “any system for the
registration of firearms, firearm owners, or firearm transactions or disposi-
tions.”3  For good measure, the regulation creating NICS reiterated the senti-
ment in identical language.4  In each significant piece of firearm legislation,
Congress included provisions that specifically reject a system of gun registra-
tion.  This seems at first blush an inauspicious foundation for a federal gun
registration system.
As Justice Louis Brandeis once reminded us, however, “It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2021; Bachelor of Arts in
Political Science, University of Notre Dame, 2018.  I am grateful for the invaluable
guidance of Professor Patricia Bellia and Jack Dahm from the very outset of the writing
process.  Brandon Winchel also deserves special thanks for his incisive critiques.  Thank
you to my family for their encouragement and support, and to my fiancé, Candice, for
helping me realize accomplishments I never before thought possible.  I would also like to
thank my colleagues on the Notre Dame Law Review for their punctilious edits.  All errors are
mine alone.
1 See, e.g., National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934); Gun Control Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968).
2 18 U.S.C. § 926(a) (2018).
3 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, § 103(i), 107 Stat.
1536, 1542 (1993).
4 Department of Justice Information Systems, 28 C.F.R. § 25.9(b)(3) (2019).
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experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”5  Heeding this senti-
ment, a number of jurisdictions adopted their own systems of gun registra-
tion.  The District of Columbia, for example, passed into law the Firearms
Control Regulations Act of 1975, part of which created a registration system
for all firearms.6  Hawaii’s gun registration requirement rivals the compre-
hensive scope of Washington, D.C.’s law.7  California and a handful of other
states also have robust systems of gun registration.8
Legislation instituting a national gun registration program must be able
to withstand a Second Amendment constitutional challenge.  The Supreme
Court has not yet ruled on the issue, but its Second Amendment jurispru-
dence indicates the legal framework it would likely employ in such an analy-
sis.  Fortunately, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit—working
within the strictures of the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment pronounce-
ments—already addressed the very question of gun registration in Heller v.
District of Columbia, first in Heller II9 and again in Heller III.10  The court found
some more onerous requirements of the law violated the Second Amend-
ment, but the core of Washington, D.C.’s gun registration system passed con-
stitutional muster.11  The constitutionality of a federal system of gun
registration is therefore not a question of first impression.
The need for an effective gun policy is an urgent one.  In 2019, 39,523
people died and 30,141 were injured from gun violence.12  Taken together,
gun violence directly harmed about 69,664 people in the United States in
2019 alone,13 and the extent of the damage inflicted in that year is no out-
lier.14  Considering as well the toll taken on the families and friends of those
victims, violence inflicted with guns has had, and continues to have, a
profound impact on the country at large.15  The bare numbers illuminate a
5 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
6 D.C. CODE § 7-2502.01 (2020).
7 HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-2(a) (2019).
8 See Registration, GIFFORDS L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, https://www.giffords.
org/lawcenter/gun-laws/policy-areas/owner-responsibilities/registration/ (last visited
Oct. 7, 2020) (describing the gun registration systems of Washington, D.C., Hawaii, Califor-
nia, New York, Maryland, Connecticut, and New Jersey).
9 Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
10 Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller III), 801 F.3d 264 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
11 See Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1254 (finding that requiring handgun registration is “long-
standing in American law” and thus “does not impinge upon the right protected by the
Second Amendment”); Heller III, 801 F.3d at 280–81 (affirming the constitutional finding
of Heller II and extending it to registration of long guns and other registration
requirements).
12 Past Summary Ledgers, GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE, https://www.gunviolencearchive.
org/past-tolls (last visited Dec. 6, 2020).  Those numbers include suicides, which typically
total about 22,000 per year in the United States alone. Id.
13 Id.
14 In 2018, gun violence killed or injured about 65,058 people; in 2017, about 68,961
people; and in 2016, about 67,782 people. Id.
15 AMNESTY INT’L, IN THE LINE OF FIRE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE US GUN VIOLENCE
CRISIS 9 (2018) (explaining how “[t]he impact of firearm violence extends far beyond the
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simple fact: there is a crisis of gun violence in the United States that Congress
has yet to adequately address.
As vital as it is to our federal system of government to allow states to
tinker with innovative policies, eventually those experiments must end and
any successful findings should be implemented in jurisdictions beyond the
original state “laboratory.”  And on the issue of gun safety legislation, the
results are in.  In states with more rigorous firearm regulations, fewer people
die from guns, while in states with less rigorous firearm regulations, more
people die from guns.16  The correlation is incontrovertible and worth
repeating: states with strong gun laws have the lowest gun death rates, and
states with weak gun laws have the highest gun death rates.17
Despite the success of states in demonstrating the efficacy of tighter gun
legislation, interstate gun trafficking stymies the ability of states to stem gun
violence within their borders.  The current patchwork of state laws is wanting
for a system of federal regulation.  The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives (“ATF”) collects data that traces the origins of guns used or
suspected to have been used in crimes, and the numbers underscore that
“most crime guns confiscated in states with relatively restrictive laws gov-
erning gun ownership and sales tend to have been first purchased . . . in a
state that has more lax laws.”18  Even a brief analysis of ATF crime-gun trace
data comparing the proportion of out-of-state crime guns to the stringency of
that state’s gun policies illustrates this pattern.19  No matter how comprehen-
numbers of those injured and killed” by causing “long-lasting trauma . . . on victims, survi-
vors, families and communities”).
16 See, e.g., Eric W. Fleegler, Lois K. Lee, Michael C. Monuteaux, David Hemenway &
Rebekah Mannix, Firearm Legislation and Firearm-Related Fatalities in the United States, 173 J.
AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 732, 735 (2013); Statistics, GIFFORDS L. CTR. TO PREVENT
GUN VIOLENCE, https://lawcenter.giffords.org/facts/gun-violence-statistics/ (last visited
Oct. 24, 2020).
17 See Annual Gun Law Scorecard, GIFFORDS L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, https://
giffords.org/lawcenter/resources/scorecard/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2020).
18 Joseph A. Peters, Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Gun Crime and Gun Control: The
Hawaiian Experience, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 55, 73.
19 Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence ranks each state based on the
strength of its gun laws, with “A” rankings generally signifying strong gun legislation and
“F” rankings signifying weak gun legislation. See Annual Gun Law Scorecard, supra note 17.
In states with the strictest gun laws, ranging here from “A” to “A-” rankings, the following
percentages of all crime guns traced by the ATF in 2017 originated from out of state:
California, 58.11%; New Jersey, 88.31%; Connecticut, 68.06%; Maryland, 67.91%; Massa-
chusetts, 78.90%; New York, 85.19%; Hawaii, 79.86%; and Illinois, 64.49%. See id.; Firearms
Trace Data—2017, ATF (Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.atf.gov/resource-center/firearms-
trace-data-2017.  In states with the weakest gun laws, here all “F” rankings, the following
percentages of all crime guns traced by the ATF in 2017 originated from out of state:
Alaska, 35.72%; Kansas, 48.36%; Arizona, 41.29%; Missouri, 38.50%; Idaho, 51.03%; Wyo-
ming, 58.48%; and Mississippi, 41.46%. See Annual Gun Law Scorecard, supra note 17; Fire-
arms Trace Data—2017, supra.  While out-of-state guns contribute to crime to some degree
in every state, those states with stricter gun laws bear the brunt of interstate gun trafficking
resulting in crime.  States with weak gun laws, on the other hand, are less frequently on the
receiving end of gun trafficking because criminals have easier access to in-state guns.
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sive a state’s gun regulations, its efforts are partially undercut by a neighbor
state with a dearth of gun regulations.  The federal system was designed pre-
cisely for matters such as this—when the policy of one state harms the citi-
zens of another, and particularly when the aggrieved state is powerless to
remediate that harm, Congress must legislate.20
The implementation of a national regulatory program is no easy task,
but this Note offers a viable path forward.  Inspired by Congress blanching at
the possible use of NICS data to establish a federal gun registry, one starting
point to establish a federal gun registry is the use of NICS data.  Although
posited more disapprovingly than here, the National Rifle Association (NRA)
succinctly explained the role of NICS in establishing a national gun registra-
tion system:
NICS would become a registry of firearm transfers if all firearm transfers
were subject to NICS checks, the FBI retained records of approved checks
indefinitely, and such records included information currently maintained
on federal Form 4473s, which document the identity of a person who
acquires a firearm from a firearm dealer, along with the make, model and
serial number of the firearm acquired.  Over time, as people would sell or
bequeath their firearms, a registry of firearm transfers would become a regis-
try of firearms possessed.21
Transforming NICS into a national firearm registration system may overhaul
the current system, but even so, it is better than building from scratch.  The
foundation and framework are sturdy; though extensive, the renovation need
not raze the existing structure.
In advocating on behalf of the ingenuity of state policymaking, Justice
Brandeis declared: “If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our
minds be bold.”22  Today, it is not enough for the states alone to effect bold
policy visions.  Gun violence is a national affliction, and none other than the
federal government is sufficiently equipped to treat it.  A system of firearms
registration is a good place to start.
This Note is organized as follows.  Part I outlines the evolving history of
federal firearm legislation and its relevance to registration.  Part I also
presents promising state-level (or equivalent) systems of gun registration that
may inform a like federal policy.  Part II establishes the Supreme Court’s
Second Amendment jurisprudence and its potential application to federal
firearms registration.  Part III then details a lower court’s application of
Supreme Court precedent to existing firearm registration laws.  Finally, this
20 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“The federal constitution forms a happy combination . . . the great and aggregate inter-
ests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the state legislatures.”).
Surely, the danger and impact of gun violence felt to varying extents by all Americans
qualifies as one of those “great and aggregate interests.” Id.
21 Gun Registration — Gun Licensing, NRA-ILA (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.nraila.org/
get-the-facts/registration-licensing/.
22 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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Note concludes by articulating how Congress can and why it must institute a
federal firearms registration system.
I. BACKGROUND ON EXISTING FEDERAL AND STATE FIREARM LAWS
Before turning to specific systems of firearm registration, the history and
current landscape of the policy is vital to understand.  Part I will first examine
the history of major federal gun legislation, then highlight examples of
existing state-level firearm registration systems.
A. Historical Federal Laws Relating to Firearm Registration
The modern national political landscape has proven intractably indis-
posed to passing any sort of gun safety legislation, even in the face of tragic
and widely publicized mass shootings.23  But Congress has not always been
this impotent.  The following subsections will highlight the most significant
federal gun laws of the past century, the effects of which still reverberate
today.  Most importantly, the failures and successes of these laws inform
future gun reform efforts.
1. The National Firearms Act of 1934
Congress has not always legislated in accord with its recent hostility to a
system of gun registration.  The National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA) is the
earliest federal law regulating firearms that, though subsequently amended,
remains in effect today.24  As originally enacted, the NFA regulated machine
guns, shotguns and rifles with barrels less than eighteen inches long, guns
except for pistols and revolvers “capable of being concealed on the person,”
23 See, e.g., Ted Barrett & Tom Cohen, Senate Rejects Expanded Gun Background Checks,
CNN POL. (Apr. 18, 2013), https://www.cnn.com/2013/04/17/politics/senate-guns-vote/
index.html (detailing how legislation to expand background checks was thwarted in the
aftermath of the 2012 Sandy Hook elementary school shooting, which killed twenty ele-
mentary schoolchildren and six school staff members); Daniella Diaz, A Month After Las
Vegas Shooting, There’s Still No Bump Stock Regulation, CNN POL. (Nov. 2, 2017), https://
www.cnn.com/2017/11/01/politics/bump-stock-gun-debate-congress/index.html (report-
ing on how both legislation and regulations to ban bump stocks stalled despite purported
bipartisan support in the aftermath of the 2017 Las Vegas concert shooting, the deadliest
in modern American history); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Shooting Victims’ Families Watch as Gun
Measures Stall Once Again, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/
21/us/shooting-victims-families-watch-as-gun-measures-stall-once-again.html (“[T]he Sen-
ate rejected four gun safety measures . . . one week after the Pulse nightclub massacre,
which killed [forty-nine] and injured [fifty-three] . . . .”).
24 See Don J. Calvert, Tanarra James & John B. Ross, Brief History of National Firearms Act
and Gun Control Act, in TXCLE FIREARMS LAW: WHAT EVERY TEXAS LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW,
STATE BAR OF TEXAS, Westlaw (2018); Sarah Gray, Here’s a Timeline of the Major Gun Control
Laws in America, TIME (last updated Apr. 30, 2019), https://time.com/5169210/us-gun-
control-laws-history-timeline/. See generally National Firearms Act, ATF, https://www.atf.gov/
rules-and-regulations/national-firearms-act (Apr. 7, 2020).
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and any sort of muffler or silencer.25  In addition to imposing various taxes,
the law required all importers, manufacturers, dealers, and possessors to reg-
ister these kinds of guns and gun accessories with the Secretary of the Trea-
sury.26  Failure to comply within the statutorily imposed time limits could
result in criminal prosecution, with maximum penalties of a $2000 fine or
five years in prison, or both.27  Decades later in Haynes v. United States, how-
ever, the Supreme Court defanged the firearm registration regulatory power
of the NFA by finding that, because registration was mandatory, and because
“a prospective registrant realistically can expect that registration will substan-
tially increase the likelihood of his prosecution,” the law violated the Fifth
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.28  Once the Court tore its
longstanding gun regulations asunder, Congress promptly acted to reassem-
ble the tattered remains.
2. The Gun Control Act of 1968
To remedy this newfound constitutional defect, Congress amended the
NFA with Title II of the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA).29  The GCA elimi-
nated the mandatory registration of firearms for possessors of unregistered
firearms; even further, it included “no mechanism for a possessor to register
an unregistered NFA firearm already possessed by the person.”30  Congress,
in an abundance of constitutional caution, also specified that information
obtained from the registration of a firearm shall not be used against that
registrant in a criminal proceeding, unless the violation of law occurred after
the registration.31  In other words, the information supplied for the registra-
tion of firearms under the NFA could now only criminally implicate regis-
trants for crimes committed after their registration, not for crimes
committed before or concurrent with their registration.  The Court found
these GCA amendments satisfactorily resolved the NFA’s prior self-incrimina-
tion flaw.32
By shoring up the constitutionality of the NFA registration system, and
by introducing some novel policy features, the GCA ensured that its firearm
registration requirements had legal teeth.  It codified an official National
Firearms Registration and Transfer Record to be maintained by the Secretary
of the Treasury, subjecting manufacturers, importers, and makers of NFA
25 National Firearms Act, ch. 757, § 1(a), 48 Stat. 1236, 1236 (1934).
26 Id. § 9, 48 Stat. at 1239.
27 Id. § 14, 48 Stat. at 1240.
28 390 U.S. 85, 97, 100 (1968); see U.S. CONST. amend. V.
29 Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 201, 82 Stat. 1213, 1227 (1968);
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NATIONAL
FIREARMS ACT HANDBOOK § 1.1.2, at 1 (2009) [hereinafter NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT
HANDBOOK].
30 NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 29, § 1.1.2, at 1.
31 Gun Control Act of 1968 § 210, 82 Stat. at 1232; NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT HAND-
BOOK, supra note 29, § 3.4.1, at 25.
32 United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 606 (1971).
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firearms to a strict registration requirement.33  Though mere possessors can
no longer be criminally liable for failing to register, the GCA applies to all
transfers of NFA firearms, mandating that transferors register the gun to the
transferee.34  Notwithstanding the “mere possessor” loophole, the GCA
imposes rigorous registration requirements on the weapons within its pur-
view.  NFA firearms can only be transferred once the transferor files a written
application to the Secretary of the Treasury and pays the tax; the transferee is
identified, by photograph and fingerprints if a natural person; the transferor
is identified; the firearm is properly identified; and the Secretary approves
the transfer.35  Failure to comply with any provision of the GCA could result
in criminal penalties up to a $5000 fine or five years in prison, or both.36
The GCA additionally expanded the NFA definition of “firearm” by clari-
fying what constitutes a machine gun and adding “destructive device[s],”
which include weapons like missiles and bombs.37  It is not too fanciful a
proposition that the registration requirements on the manufacture, importa-
tion, and transfer of NFA weapons play a role in explaining the absence of
civilian casualties from such regulated weapons as umbrella guns, sub-
machine guns, grenades, RPG launchers, mortars, and automatic cannons.38
3. The Firearms Owners’ Protection Act
Congress has made numerous changes to the federal firearm registra-
tion system in the years since these NFA and GCA developments.  The Fire-
arms Owners’ Protection Act, for instance, banned the transfer or possession
of machine guns, except those that were lawfully possessed and registered
before the law went into effect in 1986.39  This in effect set a hard maximum
on the number of machine guns available in the United States, which,
according to the ATF, was 630,019 in April of 2017.40  Registration and other
regulations of NFA firearms have proven effective in preventing the infliction
of violence with these weapons, but the number of NFA firearms subject to
such requirements is negligible when compared to the total number of guns
in the United States today.  While the exact number of U.S. firearms is elu-
sive, at least partially because of the lack of a national system of gun registra-
33 26 U.S.C. § 5841 (2018); Gun Control Act of 1968 § 201, 82 Stat. at 1229.
34 Gun Control Act of 1968 § 201, 82 Stat. at 1229.
35 26 U.S.C. § 5812 (2018).
36 Gun Control Act of 1968 § 102, 82 Stat. at 1223–24.
37 Id. § 102, 82 Stat. at 1230–31.
38 NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 29, § 2.1, at 5–20; see Heath Druzin,
Automatic Weapons Are Legal, But It Takes a Lot to Get One of the 630,000 in the U.S., BOISE
STATE PUB. RADIO (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.boisestatepublicradio.org/post/automatic-
weapons-are-legal-it-takes-lot-get-one-630000-us#stream/0 (“Machine guns covered by the
1934 National Firearms Act have never been used in a mass shooting in America.”).
39 Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 102, 100 Stat. 449, 453
(1986); NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 29, § 1.1.3, at 2.
40 BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FIRE-
ARMS COMMERCE IN THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL STATISTICAL UPDATE 2017, at 15 (2017).
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tion, a recent study estimated the United States had over 393 million civilian-
held firearms in 2017.41
Certainly the NFA and its progeny serve as useful data points when con-
sidering future policy solutions to gun violence, but a registration system
applicable to all types of guns, for which this Note advocates, would necessa-
rily operate at a scale magnitudes larger than any national firearm regulation
currently in existence.
4. The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993
The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 (“Brady Law”) has
become the most consequential gun law in modern U.S. history because it
permitted the formation of NICS, the first federal regulatory system intended
to provide a check on most every gun sale.  After years of troublesome
interim provisions that faced constitutional challenges for commandeering
states into conducting background checks on handgun purchases,42 NICS
finally became operational in 1998 and thenceforth mandated background
checks on the purchasers of any type of firearm from a Federal Firearm
Licensee (FFL).43
The Brady Law mandates that any person “engage[d] in the business of
importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, or importing or manufac-
turing ammunition” obtain a Federal Firearm License.44  Obtaining a Fed-
eral Firearm License involves submitting an application with one’s
photograph and fingerprints to the Attorney General, as well as paying a
yearly licensing fee.45  An unlicensed person seeking to buy a firearm from
an FFL is required to complete a firearms transaction record, ATF Form
4473.46  The form’s requested information includes the transferee’s name,
sex, residence address, date and place of birth, height, weight, race, country
of citizenship, State of residence, “and certification by the transferee” that his
or her possession or transportation of the gun is not prohibited by federal
law.47  It also asks the transferee to identify, as applicable, the firearm’s man-
ufacturer, importer, type, model, caliber, gauge, and serial number.48  For
transferees who successfully receive a firearm following a NICS check, FFLs
41 AARON KARP, SMALL ARMS SURV., ESTIMATING GLOBAL CIVILIAN-HELD FIREARMS NUM-
BERS 4, tbl.1 (2018).
42 See e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997).
43 About NICS, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/nics/about-nics (last visited Oct.
11, 2020); see also National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NCIS), FBI, https://
www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/nics (last visited Oct. 11, 2020).
44 18 U.S.C. § 923(a) (2018).
45 Id.
46 27 C.F.R. § 478.124(a) (2020); see BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS &
EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OMB NO. 1140-0020, ATF FORM 4473: FIREARMS TRANSAC-
TION RECORD (2020) [hereinafter FIREARMS TRANSACTION RECORD], https://www.atf.gov/
firearms/docs/4473-part-1-firearms-transaction-record-over-counter-atf-form-53009/
download.
47 27 C.F.R. § 478.124(c)(1); see FIREARMS TRANSACTION RECORD, supra note 46.
48 27 C.F.R. § 478.124(c)(4); see FIREARMS TRANSACTION RECORD, supra note 46.
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must retain their ATF Form 4473s for a minimum of ten years after the date
of sale; for transferees who fail to receive a firearm after a NICS check, FFLs
need only retain their ATF Form 4473s for a minimum of five years after the
date of the NICS inquiry.49  FFLs must organize their retained firearms trans-
action records in alphabetical, chronological, or numerical order.50
Once the FFL has received the potential firearm transferee’s ATF Form
4473, the FFL will contact the FBI, or a state point of contact (POC) if the
state has opted to liaise with the federal government on NICS, and relay the
transferee’s information.51  NICS checks available records to determine
whether the transfer of a firearm would violate any federal or state laws.52  A
person is effectively prohibited by federal law from possessing a firearm if
she: (1) has been convicted of or is under indictment for a crime punishable
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; (2) “is a fugitive from jus-
tice”; (3) “is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance”; (4)
“has been adjudicated as a mental defective or . . . has been committed to a
mental institution”; (5) is an “illegal[ ]” or “unlawful[ ]” alien present in the
United States, or, in some cases, is “admitted to the United States under a
nonimmigrant visa”; (6) “has been discharged from the Armed Forces under
dishonorable conditions”; (7) has renounced her United States citizenship;
(8) is subject to a court restraining order to prevent contact with an intimate
partner or a child of an intimate partner; or (9) “has been convicted in any
court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”53
Whether the FFL conducts the NICS check by phone or internet, the
procedure is nearly identical.  If the initial database check finds no matching
records of concern, then the transaction can proceed unimpeded; if it finds
matching records, the case is transferred to a NICS Legal Instruments Exam-
iner (“NICS Examiner”) to make a final determination.54  Most NICS checks
take only a few short minutes from start to finish,55 and perhaps to preempt
the possibility that background checks unduly hinder access to firearms, a
NICS delay lasting longer than three business days permits the FFL to trans-
fer the gun to the transferee.56  A NICS Examiner has up to ninety days to
make a final decision on a case, so if she discovers the transferee is legally
prohibited from gun ownership after the FFL already sold the weapon, the
FBI will task the ATF with a retrieval order to recover the gun.57  Predictably,
49 27 C.F.R. § 478.129(b).
50 Id. § 478.124(b).
51 About NICS, supra note 43; 27 C.F.R. § 478.102(b).
52 About NICS, supra note 43; 27 C.F.R. § 478.102(a)(2)(i).
53 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), (n) (2018).
54 See About NICS, supra note 43; NICS & Reporting Procedures, GIFFORDS L. CTR. TO
PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, https://giffords.org/lawcenter/gun-laws/policy-areas/back-
ground-checks/nics-reporting-procedures/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2020).
55 See About NICS, supra note 43; NICS & Reporting Procedures, supra note 54.
56 27 C.F.R. § 478.102(a)(2)(ii).
57 Jennifer Mascia, Everything You Need to Know About Federal Background Checks, THE
TRACE (Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.thetrace.org/2015/07/gun-background-check-nics-
guide.
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this eighty-seven-day period in which someone ineligible to possess a gun may
do just that after purchasing it lawfully can, and has, resulted in tragedy.58
When NICS denies a transfer because that potential transferee’s posses-
sion of a firearm would violate federal or state law, NICS retains the records
pertinent to that attempted transaction “indefinitely.”59  Conversely, when
NICS approves a transfer, it destroys all substantive records of that transfer
“within 24 hours.”60  Such compulsory record destruction of successful fire-
arm transfers comports with the statutory and regulatory mandate that “[n]o
department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States may . . . use
[NICS] to establish any system for the registration of firearms, firearm own-
ers, or firearm transactions.”61
Were Congress to change course and pursue a federal policy to register
all firearms, ATF Form 4473s already provide ample information on both gun
and gun buyer—information foundational to any system of registration.
NICS showcases how the technical aspects of a massive federal system of
licensing, information-gathering, and policing of gun transfers can be
effected.  Since the inception of NICS in 1998, the FBI has processed more
than 320 million NICS background checks, and only about two percent have
been rejected because of the transferee’s ineligibility.62  That is not to sug-
gest NICS has been an unmitigated success story.  Loopholes and missing
records have resulted in notorious oversights.63  The NICS database relies on
“local police, sheriff’s offices, the military, federal and state courts, Indian
tribes and in some places, hospitals and treatment providers, to send criminal
or mental health records” in order to establish a reliable system for back-
ground checks.64  The sources of information comprising the database are
diffuse, resulting in a jumbled records reporting process: “Some agencies
don’t know what to send; states often lack funds needed to ensure someone
handles the data; no system of audits exists to find out who’s not reporting;
and some states lack the political will to set up a functioning and efficient
reporting process.”65  Creating a federal firearm registration system thus
58 The attacker in the April 2015 shooting of nine church parishioners in Charleston,
South Carolina, used a firearm that he bought lawfully, though his record made him ineli-
gible to own a firearm. Id.  He only obtained the weapon because the NICS check delayed
the process beyond the three-day maximum. See id.
59 28 C.F.R. § 25.9(a) (2020).
60 28 C.F.R. § 25.9(b)(1)(iii).
61 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, § 103(i), 107 Stat.
1536, 1542 (1993); see 28 C.F.R. § 25.9(b)(3).
62 Mascia, supra note 57.
63 The high-profile mass shootings at Virginia Tech in 2007, Charleston, South Caro-
lina, in 2015, Sutherland Springs, Texas, in 2017, and Aurora, Illinois, in 2019 all involved
gunmen not eligible to own a gun, but due to missing records or other human error, NICS
permitted the gun transfer to proceed. Id.
64 Martha Bellisle, Gun Background Check System Riddled with Flaws, PBS NEWSHOUR
(Mar. 10, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/gun-background-check-system-
riddled-with-flaws.
65 Id.
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necessitates political and administrative ingenuity beyond mere superimposi-
tion of the NICS processes onto a policy template for gun registration.
Despite its many flaws, it would be wise for Congress to consider and incorpo-
rate the successful features of NICS into what would become a new behe-
moth of a regulatory scheme: national gun registration.
B. State Systems of Firearm Registration
Going beyond the limited scope of the federal gun laws, a number of
states have enacted systems of gun registration, or at least have employed
policies roughly akin to one.  States (or like jurisdictions) with systems of
firearm registration or other similar policies include: the District of Colum-
bia, Hawaii, California, New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Maryland.66
In what is perhaps becoming a familiar pattern, other states explicitly forbid
the registration of firearms: Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Vermont.67  What follows is a brief delve
into the particulars of some gun registration systems already in effect on the
state level, and what Congress ought to learn from these examples.
1. The District of Columbia’s Firearm Registry
Washington, D.C., passed into law the Firearms Control Regulations Act
of 1975, part of which established a compulsory gun registration system; this
feature alone placed the law “among the strictest [gun laws] of any jurisdic-
tion in the nation.”68  As codified today, the law mandates that “no person or
organization in the District shall possess or control any firearm, unless the
person or organization holds a valid registration certificate for the fire-
arm.”69  And the application process is not perfunctory; the applicant must
present ample personal information and complete various screening
requirements.
A person seeking to purchase or in some other way receive a gun must
first apply for, and the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department must first issue,
a gun registration certificate.70  A person who moves into Washington, D.C.,
in possession of a gun must “immediately” apply to register that weapon.71
In applying for a firearms registration certificate, the applicant must at mini-
mum provide to the D.C. police chief the following information: (1) full
name; (2) “present address and each home address where the applicant has
resided” for the past five years; (3) “present business or occupation,” as well
as “the address and phone number of the employer”; (4) “date and place of
66 See Registration, supra note 8.
67 Id.
68 Under Fire: Does the District of Columbia’s Gun Ban Help or Hurt the Fight Against Crime?,
CONGRESSMAN TOM DAVIS (June 28, 2005), https://web.archive.org/web/2007022819
4658/http://tomdavis.house.gov/cgi-data/news/files/191.shtml.
69 D.C. CODE § 7-2502.01 (2020).
70 Id. § 7-2502.06.
71 Id.
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birth”; (5) sex; (6) if applicable, the reasons why any government authority
“denied or revoked the applicant’s license, registration certificate, or permit
pertaining to any firearm”; (7) a detailed description of any past “mishap”
involving a firearm; (8) “[t]he caliber, make, model, manufacturer’s identifi-
cation number, serial number, and any other identifying marks on the fire-
arm”; (9) the name, address, and, if applicable, dealer’s license number of
the firearm’s most recent transferor; and (10) the primary location the gun
will be kept.72  D.C. police are required to take and maintain each appli-
cant’s fingerprints and a “full-face photograph.”73  Each applicant must also
“sign an oath or affirmation,” under the penalty of perjury, attesting to the
information provided in the application process,74 pay a fee,75 and “com-
plete a firearms training and safety class provided by the Chief.”76
If applying “for a registration certificate for a pistol to be used for the
purpose of self-defense within [the applicant’s] home,” the applicant must,
in addition to all the procedures laid out above, present to the police “[a]
valid driver’s license or a letter from a physician attesting that the applicant
has vision at least as good as that required for a driver’s license,” and some
sort of D.C. residency verification.77
Barring a certain class of firearms from registration effectively outlaws
that gun because only registered firearms can be lawfully possessed in Wash-
ington, D.C.  Under D.C. law, “registration certificate[s] shall not be issued
for”: (1) sawed-off shotguns; (2) machine guns; (3) short-barreled rifles; (4)
pistols not validly registered to the current registrant prior to September, 24,
1976, though this particular ban has numerous exceptions and qualifications;
(5) “unsafe firearm[s],” specifically defined elsewhere; (6) assault weapons;
or (7) .50 BMG rifles.78  Such listed firearms are thus effectually prohibited
in the District, minus rather narrow exceptions unimportant here.
The laws and rules governing firearm registration in Washington, D.C.,
amount to the strictest registration requirements in the United States, and,
more broadly, place D.C. in the upper echelons of jurisdictions with all-
around robust gun laws.  Likely for this reason, constitutional challenges
have long bombarded D.C.’s gun registry; the ensuing cases and doctrine will
be discussed in Parts II and III.
72 Id. § 7-2502.03(b).  Note that the numbers listed may not align with those in the
statute because of a repealed section and omissions of irrelevant information. See APPLICA-




73 D.C. CODE § 7-2502.04(a)–(b) (2020).
74 Id. § 7-2502.05(a), (c).
75 Id. § 7-2502.05(b); APPLICATION FOR FIREARMS REGISTRATION CERTIFICATE, supra note
72 (application fee of thirteen dollars).
76 D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 24, § 2311.9 (2020).
77 Id. tit. 24, §§ 2320.1, 2320.3(c)(1)(B)–(C).
78 D.C. CODE § 7-2502.02(a) (2020).
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2. Hawaii’s Firearm Registry
Before a resident can possess a firearm, Hawaii requires her to “pro-
cure[ ] from the chief of police . . . a permit to acquire the ownership of a
firearm.”79  Permit application forms collect the applicant’s “name, address,
sex, height, weight, date of birth, place of birth, country of citizenship, social
security number, alien or admission number, . . . mental health history
and . . . fingerprint[s] and photograph[s].”80  Only persons twenty-one years
of age or older can purchase a gun in Hawaii.81  A person seeking to
purchase a gun must wait a minimum of fourteen days from the date of
applying for a permit, and no more than twenty days before hearing a final
determination on the issuance of the permit.82  Once the prospective gun
buyer receives a permit, she can acquire the gun.
Once the person acquires the firearm, she must register that weapon
“within five days of acquisition.”83  In addition, even a person who brings a
firearm into Hawaii from out of state must “register [it] within five days after
arrival . . . with the chief of police.”84  Registration forms are “uniform
throughout the State,” and include the “name of the manufacturer and
importer; model; type of action; caliber or gauge; serial number; and source
from which receipt was obtained, including the name and address of the
prior registrant.”85  Registration, unless already procured through the per-
mitting process or some other means, requires each registrant “be finger-
printed and photographed by the police department” conducting the
registration.86  Hawaii keeps confidential that personal information the fire-
arm registry collects; it can be disclosed, however, for general administrative
purposes, “lawful performance” of law enforcement agency duties, or if so
ordered by a court.87  Registrants must also pay a registration fee to the
county.88
Though the permitting process and other minute procedures distin-
guish the firearm registration systems of Washington, D.C., and Hawaii, in
essence both jurisdictions impose near-universal registration requirements
on those residents seeking to possess guns.  Both collect and maintain consid-
erable and detailed information about the gun possessed and its possessor.
Such a policy is beautiful for its simplicity: no unregistered gun can lawfully
be possessed.  And simplicity is ever a virtue in public policy, particularly
when contemplating the expansion of a state registration system to the
national scale.  No matter how conceptually pleasing, however, an actual
79 HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-2(a) (2019).
80 Id. § 134-2(b).
81 Id. § 134-2(d).
82 Id. § 134-2(e).
83 Id. § 134-3(b).
84 Id. § 134-3(a).
85 Id. § 134-3(b).
86 Id. § 134-3(a).
87 Id. § 134-3(b).
88 See id. § 134-3(e).
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transition from the absence of a firearm registration mandate to universal
compliance with one demands some policy ingenuity—particularly when
occurring in a nation with over 330 million inhabitants.  Rather than wishing
for all U.S. gun owners to willingly report their firearm ownership informa-
tion, a better transition policy might place the registration onus at the time
of gun sale or transfer.  Fortunately, some states have already experimented
with this precise policy suggestion.
3. California’s Firearm Registry
While Hawaii and the District of Columbia offer glimpses of an ideal
registration policy—attractive for its simplicity—California demonstrates how
a jurisdiction with a large population can realistically implement a system of
firearm registration.  Comprehension of California’s gun registry, however,
first requires a primer on the state’s overall firearm legislation.
California serves as a model for comprehensive gun violence prevention
policy.89  It both maintains a firearm registration system and employs a
diverse slate of gun safety measures: barring firearm access to those convicted
of certain crimes or in other narrow circumstances;90 restricting long gun
purchases to California residents eighteen years of age and older and hand-
gun purchases to those twenty-one years of age and older;91 licensing fire-
arms dealers and conducting background checks through the state
Department of Justice;92 imposing a mandatory ten-day waiting period before
the buyer can receive the gun;93 requiring proof of residency;94 administer-
ing a written firearm safety exam to receive a certificate needed to buy a
gun;95 instructing the gun buyer precisely how to safely handle the pur-
chased weapon, guided by the firearms dealer;96 mandating the sale of lock
boxes or safes along with every gun sold;97 limiting the makes and models of
guns that may be sold to those who “passed required safety and functionality
tests”;98 and restricting the frequency of handgun sales to one for every thirty
days.99  New California residents must report their firearms to the state
Department of Justice or otherwise transfer ownership of the weapons within
sixty days of arriving.100
89 See Annual Gun Law Scorecard, supra note 17 (ranking California with the top score
of “A” for strength of gun safety policies).
90 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 29800–25 (West 2020); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 8100,
8103 (West 2020).




94 CAL. PENAL CODE § 26845 (West 2020).
95 Id. §§ 31610–70.
96 Id. § 26850.
97 Id. §§ 23635–90.
98 HARRIS, supra note 91, at 4; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 32000 (West 2020).
99 CAL. PENAL CODE § 27535 (West 2020).
100 HARRIS, supra note 91, at 6.
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For every firearm sale in California, the parties to the transfer must cre-
ate a painstakingly detailed electronic transfer record that includes forty
items of information related to the gun, the seller, and the buyer.101  For
information about the gun, for example, they must note the firearm’s
type,102  make,103 caliber,104 barrel length,105 color,106 manufacturer’s
name,107 model name or number,108 serial number,109 status as new or
used,110 and other useful identifying information.111  Information about the
seller must include the seller’s name and business address,112 business phone
number,113 signature,114 California Firearms Dealer number,115 and certifi-
cate of eligibility number.116  For the firearm buyer, the electronic transfer
record requires the buyer’s full name,117 gender,118 date and place of
birth,119 local address,120 telephone number,121 occupation,122 signature,123
identification card,124 physical description,125 complete list of past legal
names and aliases,126 answers to questions that could disqualify the buyer
from acquiring a firearm,127 and firearm safety certificate number.128  The
parties must lastly respond to a few other miscellaneous questions.129  Cali-
fornia evidently seeks to attain the most amount of information possible
about all gun transfers occurring within its borders.
101 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 28160 (West 2020).
102 Id. § 28160(a)(14).
103 Id. § 28160(a)(2).
104 Id. § 28160(a)(13).
105 Id. § 28160(a)(16).
106 Id. § 28160(a)(17).
107 Id. § 28160(a)(7).
108 Id. § 28160(a)(8).
109 Id. § 28160(a)(9).
110 Id. § 28160(a)(15).
111 Id. § 28160(a)(10)–(12).
112 Id. § 28160(a)(33).
113 Id. § 28160(a)(35).
114 Id. § 28160(a)(31).
115 Id. § 28160(a)(5).
116 Id. § 28160(a)(32).
117 Id. § 28160(a)(18).
118 Id. § 28160(a)(26).
119 Id. § 28160(a)(19), (23).
120 Id. § 28160(a)(20).
121 Id. § 28160(a)(24).
122 Id. § 28160(a)(25).
123 Id. § 28160(a)(30).
124 Id. § 28160(a)(22).
125 Id. § 28160(a)(27).
126 Id. § 28160(a)(28).
127 Id. § 28160(a)(29).
128 Id. § 28160(a)(40).
129 Id. § 28160(a)(1), (3), (4), (6), (34), (36)–(39).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-3\NDL310.txt unknown Seq: 16 18-JAN-21 11:53
1362 notre dame law review [vol. 96:3
California statutes direct the state attorney general to collect, “perma-
nently keep,” file, and maintain these electronic transfer records.130  Beyond
simply storing files, the California Attorney General must develop a registry
of firearms and their owners to aid in prosecution of crimes, civil actions, and
other property disputes concerning firearms.131  The firearm registry incor-
porates all the information required by the electronic transfer records, mean-
ing that information about the buyer, the seller, and the firearm itself are all
kept accessible for use by state government officials of all stripes and even
some agencies and organizations outside the government.132  California’s
wider array of gun safety policies take on even greater import as the gun
registry enables proper monitoring and enforcement of those laws’ manifold
directives.
The most pressing difference between California’s gun registration sys-
tem and those of Washington, D.C., and Hawaii is not the end result of a
fairly comprehensive gun registry used primarily for law enforcement pur-
poses—all firearm registration systems share that goal.  Rather, the lesson
that can be gleaned from California that may be missed by focusing only on
the experiences of the District of Columbia and Hawaii is that emphasis on
data collection at the transfer stage reduces the burden on the gun buyers
and sellers and thus boosts compliance.  California, a state with a large popu-
lation of gun owners, crafted a gun registry from scratch by tamping its regu-
lations into the firearm sales process.  California thus brought into reality the
NRA’s dreaded NICS premonition: “Over time, as people would sell or
bequeath their firearms, a registry of firearm transfers would become a regis-
try of firearms possessed.”133  These jurisdictions provide useful visions of
how an implemented firearm registry might function; before any such vision
can be realized, however, Congress must earnestly address whether the legis-
lation complies with the Second Amendment.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S SECOND AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Part II provides a general overview of Supreme Court precedent on the
Second Amendment.  The Constitution offers a succinct proclamation: “A
well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”134  The cases
discussed below work to define the precise meaning of this right.
The scope of the Second Amendment, “such a significant matter[,] has
been for so long judicially unresolved” because, “[f]or most of our his-
tory, . . . the Federal Government did not significantly regulate the possession
of firearms by law-abiding citizens.”135  Here, as we conceive of a universal
130 Id. § 11106(b)(1) (amended 2020).
131 See id. § 11106(a)(1), (b)(1), (2).
132 See id. at § 11106(b)(2)(A)–(D), (3); id. § 11105.
133 Gun Registration—Gun Licensing, supra note 21.
134 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
135 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008).
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federal firearms registration system, judicial interpretation of the Second
Amendment has the single-handed potential to either doom or sustain the
whole enterprise.  Where the Supreme Court has been and where it is liable
to go on this matter is therefore worthy of an in-depth examination.
A. The Right to Bear Arms: A General or Militia-Bound Right?
Central in determining the scope of the right granted by the Second
Amendment is the issue of whether that right applies to all individuals irre-
spective of their relation to any militia or only to those engaged in militia
service.  The Supreme Court has gone about settling the matter in a mere
handful of cases, but, because of the 5–4 splits and the recency of the deci-
sions, current Second Amendment jurisprudence remains an uneasy one.
1. United States v. Miller
United States v. Miller involved an indictment of two men for transporting
a shotgun with a barrel less than eighteen inches long in interstate com-
merce, a violation of the National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA).136  As may be
recalled from subsection I.A.1, this kind of weapon was, and remains, subject
to registration requirements137 with which the appellees allegedly failed to
comply.138  The District Court found that then-section eleven of the NFA,
which pronounced that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person who is required
to register . . . and who shall not have so registered, . . . to ship, carry, or
deliver any firearm in interstate commerce,”139 violated the Second Amend-
ment.140  The lower court thereby quashed the indictment, and the United
States appealed directly to the Supreme Court.141
In a unanimous decision, the Court reversed the lower court and con-
cluded that the Second Amendment does not “guarantee[ ] the right to keep
and bear” a weapon unless it “has some reasonable relationship to the preser-
vation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.”142  It expounded that the
Second Amendment was enshrined for the purpose of “assur[ing] the contin-
uation and render[ing] possible the effectiveness” of the militia.143  In light
of its purpose to promote a robust militia, the Court unambiguously declared
the Second Amendment “must be interpreted and applied with that end in
view.”144
136 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 175 (1939).
137 See supra text accompanying notes 25–28.
138 Miller, 307 U.S. at 175.
139 Id. at 177 n.1 (quoting National Firearms Act, ch. 757, § 11, 48 Stat. 1236, 1239
(1934)).
140 Id. at 177.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 178, 183.
143 Id.
144 Id.
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The Court looked to “the debates in the [Constitutional] Convention,
the history and legislation of Colonies and States, and the writings of
approved commentators” such as Blackstone and Adam Smith, to discern the
place of the militia in American society around the time of the adoption of
the Constitution and the Second Amendment.145  Americans at this time
widely and “strongly disfavored standing armies; the common view was that
adequate defense of country and laws could be secured through the Militia—
civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion.”146  This partiality for state militias
over standing armies caused the Framers to empower Congress to “call[ ]
forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections
and repel Invasions” and to “provide for organizing, arming, and disciplin-
ing, the Militia.”147
The militia was comprised of “all males physically capable of acting in
concert for the common defense,” and when these men were “called for ser-
vice,” they were “expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves
and of the kind in common use at the time.”148  In fact, a number of states in the
late eighteenth century required that militia members arm themselves with
appropriate weaponry in preparation for a call to arms.149  To resolve the
case at hand, the Court contented itself with the finding that the short-bar-
reled shotgun at issue was not “of the kind in common use at the time” for
militia defense,150 and thus it was not protected by the Second
Amendment.151
Because ownership of this kind of firearm did not, in the Court’s view,
implicate the appellees’ Second Amendment “right to keep and bear
[Arms],” there was no longer any constitutional hurdle to Congress mandat-
ing the registration of such a weapon.152  The legal matter at hand disposed
of, the Court ended its analysis.  It did not opine on the fate of a registration
requirement of a firearm that is protected by the Second Amendment, nor
even what it takes for a firearm, other than a short-barreled shotgun, to
receive Second Amendment protection.
Does the protection extend merely to those classes of weapons fit for use
in state militias?  If so, would the right apply only to the weapons used by the
eighteenth-century militias, or would it include modern weapons of war?
Or does the Second Amendment right concern the actual use of the
weapon?  Does it cover the ownership of a weapon only when that weapon is
used for militia service, or is the right more general? Miller left unanswered
145 Id. at 179.
146 Id.
147 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15–16; see Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
148 Miller, 307 U.S. at 179 (emphasis added).
149 See id. at 180–82 (explaining that Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia each
enacted laws mandating that militiamen arm themselves, often requiring a musket with a
barrel of appropriate length).
150 Id. at 178–79.
151 Id. at 178.
152 See id.
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the vital question of what precisely the Second Amendment protects, trailing
a substantial measure of confusion in its wake.153
2. District of Columbia v. Heller
The Supreme Court did not squarely address the scope of the Second
Amendment again until sixty-nine years after Miller, in District of Columbia v.
Heller.154  This case was seminal in Second Amendment jurisprudence, and it
consequently attracted ample academic attention.155  In spite of Heller’s sta-
tus as a case study in constitutional interpretation and its obvious relevance
to gun rights writ large, this Note will not undertake a rigorous reexamina-
tion of the legal reasoning undergirding the lengthy opinions.  That ground,
once fertile, has since been well trodden and will not benefit greatly from
another till.  Rather, the analysis that follows focuses on those issues broadly
relevant to the inquiry at hand as background information to inform the
kind of constitutional attention a federal gun registration bill may garner.
Before turning to the details of Heller, it is helpful to note the Court’s
fractured take on the holding of Miller.  Justice Scalia, writing for a majority
of five, “read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect
those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful pur-
poses, such as short-barreled shotguns.”156  Scalia contended this interpreta-
tion of Miller “accords with the historical understanding of the scope of the
right.”157  Scalia correctly argued that the Miller Court distinguished between
types of weapons, but Miller did not do so simply by asking whether the fire-
arm in question was “typically possessed by law abiding citizens.”158  As dis-
cussed above, Miller framed the scope of Second Amendment protection
based on whether the type of gun was commonly owned for militia service.159
153 See, e.g., Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, Federal Constitutional Right to Bear Arms, 37
A.L.R. Fed. 696, 709 (1978) (“Although the courts continue to cite United States v. Miller . . .
for the proposition that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is not appli-
cable when there is no relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated
militia . . . some courts and commentators have had difficulty understanding what the
Supreme Court actually held in United States v. Miller.” (emphasis added)).
154 554 U.S. 570, 570 (2008).
155 See generally Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District
of Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625 (2008); Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in
Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J.
1371 (2009); Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1343 (2009); Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Original-
ism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923 (2009); Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV.
1551 (2009).
156 Heller, 554 U.S. at 625.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (holding that unless the firearm at
issue was shown to have “some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well regulated militia,” the Second Amendment does not “guarantee[ ] the right to keep
and bear such an instrument”).
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Indeed, lest the Miller Court’s explicit use of the word “militia” be mistaken
as an errant one, that Court consumed the better part of its unanimous opin-
ion with discussion of the laws and practices of state militias around the time
of the Founding.160  Justice Stevens, writing for a dissent of four, seemed
equally perplexed by the majority’s reading of Miller; he interpreted Miller to
hold “that [the Second Amendment] protects the right to keep and bear
arms for certain military purposes, but that it does not curtail the Legisla-
ture’s power to regulate the nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons.”161
Beyond a mere quibble over the comprehension of the Court’s longstanding
precedent, Stevens saw his version of the Miller holding to be “both the most
natural reading of the Amendment’s text and the interpretation most faithful
to the history of its adoption.”162  Undergirding these diametrically opposed
readings of a rather simple Supreme Court decision, however, is not actually
confusion of what past Justices said.  At base, the disagreement is about
whether what Miller said comports with the Second Amendment itself.163
Heller is thus most important for its novel discussion of the scope of the Sec-
ond Amendment and not so much for its take on whether Miller was correctly
decided.
At issue in Heller were restrictions on the ownership and use of hand-
guns.164  The District of Columbia effectively banned handguns by simultane-
ously criminalizing the carrying of an unregistered firearm and prohibiting
handgun registration.165  The District of Columbia also mandated that own-
ers of lawful guns keep them “unloaded and disassembled or bound by a
trigger lock or similar device” in the home.166  When Dick Heller, a Washing-
ton, D.C., police officer, applied for a registration certificate for a handgun
and was denied pursuant to the law, he sued on Second Amendment
grounds to enjoin the enforcement of these provisions.167
The Court agreed with Heller by holding, in a 5–4 decision, the Second
Amendment “protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected
with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes,
such as self-defense within the home.”168  It expounded that “self-defense . . .
was the central component of the [Second Amendment] right itself.”169  The
Court’s decision resulted from a protracted and winding examination of the
Second Amendment through the use of its text in other places in the Consti-
160 See id. at 178–82.
161 Heller, 554 U.S. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162 Id. at 637–38.
163 See id. at 679 (“[T]he majority simply does not approve of the conclusion the Miller
Court reached.”).
164 See id. at 573 (majority opinion).
165 Id. at 574–75.
166 Id. at 575.
167 See id. at 575–76.
168 Id. at 577.
169 Id. at 599 (emphasis added).
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tution,170 contemporaneous dictionary definitions,171 the historical back-
ground to the Amendment,172 the content of the 1788 ratification
debates,173 and contemporaneous state constitutional provisions that served
as “analogues” to the federal Second Amendment.174  Justice Stevens’s dis-
sent touched on all of these same interpretive methods but came to an
opposing conclusion: “The Second Amendment was adopted to protect the
right of the people of each of the several States to maintain a well-regulated
militia.”175
Commentary on the tools of constitutional interpretation employed in
Heller could span volumes, but all that matters in the context of this Note is
Heller’s legal precedent and whether it would permit a federal firearm regis-
tration system.  Important here, then, is that Heller read the Second Amend-
ment right to “keep and bear Arms” in a way that more widely protects gun
ownership against intrusion from the federal government than had any previ-
ous Supreme Court decision.176  Whether Heller’s splitting of the right to
own a firearm from any relation to militia service would change the outcome
in a case concerning a system of firearm registration, however, is yet unan-
swered by the Court.
In assessing the constitutionality of the laws in question, Scalia was prin-
cipally concerned with whether they “burden[ed] the right of self-
defense.”177  Here, the Court did not delineate to what degree a law must
burden the right of self-defense before it becomes unconstitutional—the
“absolute ban on handguns” at issue was a severe and obvious case.178  When
the Court decides on the constitutionality of a federal gun registration sys-
tem, the extent to which the law “burdens” the Second Amendment right to
self-defense will indubitably be central to its inquiry.
3. McDonald v. City of Chicago
The Bill of Rights for a long time applied only to protect citizens from
actions taken by the federal government, not the states.  The Supreme Court
affirmed this principle, reiterating that the Second Amendment only prohib-
its Congress (and presumably also the federal executive and judicial branches)
170 See id. at 579–81 (“[I]n all six other provisions of the Constitution that mention ‘the
people,’ the term unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an
unspecified subset.”).
171 See id. at 581–82.
172 See id. at 592–95 (discussing the Stuart Kings’ tactics of suppressing political dissi-
dents by disarmament).
173 See id. at 598–99.
174 See id. at 600–03.
175 Id. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176 Justice Scalia may, however, contend his holding in Heller aligns with that of Miller
and the historical intention of the Founders.  In any case, at the very least Heller inter-
preted a broader Second Amendment rule with more clarity than any Supreme Court case
ever had before.
177 See id. at 632 (majority opinion).
178 See id.
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from infringing on the right to keep and bear arms179 in a trio of late nine-
teenth-century cases: United States v. Cruikshank,180 Presser v. Illinois,181 and
Miller v. Texas.182 Heller did not alter this proposition because the matter at
issue there was a law of the District of Columbia, not a state, and thus the
prohibition was akin to Congress itself infringing on the right to keep and
bear arms.183
At issue in McDonald v. City of Chicago, on the other hand, were effective
bans on handgun possession in Chicago and Oak Park, Illinois.184  Illinois is
most assuredly a state, so the case raised the question of whether, notwith-
standing the Supreme Court precedent to the contrary, the Second Amend-
ment applied to the state governments as it did to the federal government.185
Specifically, the Court sought to decide if “the Second Amendment right to
keep and bear arms is incorporated in the concept of due process” articu-
lated in the Fourteenth Amendment.186
The Court restated the essential tenet it espoused in Heller just a couple
years earlier: “the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear
arms for the purpose of self-defense.”187  The “basic right” of “individual self-
defense is ‘the central component’ of the Second Amendment.”188  In light of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Court most novelly
held “that the Second Amendment right,” as delineated in Heller, “is fully
applicable to the States.”189 McDonald, in other words, incorporated the Sec-
ond Amendment so that it applies with equal force against state governments
as it does against the federal government.
The functional significance of McDonald is that courts must analyze laws
regulating firearms, be they enacted by Congress or state legislatures, under
the same Second Amendment framework as outlined in Heller.  These cases
make obvious that no jurisdiction in the United States can constitutionally
institute a handgun ban because it presents too great a burden on the Sec-
ond Amendment right to keep and bear arms.190
The legal framework thus established contextualizes the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence on firearm regulation under the Second Amendment,
179 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 757–58 (2010).
180 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875).
181 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886).
182 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894).
183 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 573 (“[C]onsider[ing] whether a District of Columbia prohibi-
tion on the possession of usable handguns in the home violates the Second Amendment to
the Constitution.”).
184 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750.
185 See id. at 750, 752.
186 Id. at 767; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”).
187 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 749–50 (emphasis added).
188 Id. at 767 (emphasis added) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 599).
189 Id. at 750.
190 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 636.
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but it offers no authoritative answer on the constitutionality of a federal fire-
arm registration system.  It is to this matter we turn next.
III. APPLICATION OF HELLER TO FIREARM REGISTRATION
Part III details the efforts of the lower courts to apply Heller’s principles
to mandatory firearm registration laws.  The Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the Second Amendment is certainly instructive, but, short of a handgun
ban, the Court has yet to set a discrete line over which a gun regulation
violates the Constitution.  Concededly, requiring all gun owners to register
their weapons burdens to some degree the otherwise mostly unrestricted abil-
ity to possess a gun, but the Court enunciated no precise definition of how
much of a burden is too much.  That line was left to be drawn by the lower
courts.
A. Application of the Heller Standard: Heller II
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller overturned the District’s
indirect ban on handgun possession in the home, “the D.C. Council passed
emergency legislation” amending its gun regulations to bring them into com-
pliance with the ruling while still enforcing stringent registration require-
ments.191  Plaintiffs sued again—in addition to challenging the District’s ban
on “assault weapons” and magazines with more than ten rounds of ammuni-
tion,192 they contended the registration requirements unconstitutionally bur-
dened their Second Amendment right.193  Plaintiffs challenged the law’s
registration certificate requirements that directed each applicant to: (1)
“[d]isclose certain information about himself—such as his name, address,
and occupation—and about his firearm”; (2) submit to a “ballistics identifica-
tion procedure” for each pistol; (3) appear in person at the police depart-
ment with “the firearm to be registered”; (4) “[r]egister no more than one
pistol in a [thirty]-day period”; (5) renew each registration certificate every
three years; (6) pass a vision test equivalent to that needed for a driver’s
license; (7) “[d]emonstrate knowledge of the District’s [gun] laws,” includ-
ing knowledge of the “safe and responsible use, handling, and storage” of
firearms; (8) “[s]ubmit to being fingerprinted and photographed”; (9)
“[u]ndergo a background check every six years”; and (10) “[a]ttend a fire-
arms training or safety course” consisting of at least five hours of time spent
in the classroom and shooting range.194
The court began the relevant analysis by emphasizing Heller’s proclama-
tion that “ ‘longstanding’ regulations are ‘presumptively lawful,’” meaning
191 Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
192 See id. at 1247; D.C. CODE § 7-2502.02(a)(6) (2020) (“A registration certificate shall
not be issued for . . . [a]n assault weapon . . . .”); id. § 7-2506.01(b) (“No person in the
District shall possess . . . a magazine . . . that has a capacity of . . . more than 10 rounds of
ammunition.”).
193 See Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1247.
194 Id. at 1248–49.
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they “are presumed not to burden conduct within the scope of the Second
Amendment.”195  Conversely, firearm regulations “of newer vintage” do not
carry the same presumption of lawfulness.196  As to the specific facts of the
case, the court concluded that “basic registration of handguns is deeply
enough rooted in our history to support the presumption that a registration
requirement is constitutional.”197  In deeming the practice of mandatory
handgun registration longstanding enough to merit a presumption of consti-
tutionality, the court detailed similar state laws dating back to the beginning
of the twentieth century,198 a time period apparently distant enough in his-
tory for the Heller Supreme Court to regard the practice as “longstanding.”199
The court found nothing in “the historical record or the record of this case
to rebut [the] presumption” that a handgun registry is a familiar practice in
American law.200  This means in effect that a registration system for hand-
guns does not even implicate the Second Amendment because of the “long-
standing” history of similar regulatory practices.
Elaborating on this conclusion, the court in sweeping language declared
“basic registration requirements [to be] self-evidently de minimis, for they
are similar to other common registration or licensing schemes, such as those
for voting or for driving a car, that cannot reasonably be considered oner-
ous.”201  While these words do not appear limited to systems of handgun
registration, and out of context may be read to greenlight the registration of
any kind of firearm, the court was careful to point out that basic registration
requirements for long guns “are novel, not historic,” and thus do not deserve
the same presumption of constitutionality as handgun registries.202  A system
of gun registration, however, may of course still have a de minimis impact on
a person’s Second Amendment right even if it has never before been imple-
mented.  So while the court’s statement that “basic registration requirements
are self-evidently de minimis” should be read in context as most directly dis-
cussing handgun registries,203 the fundamental point still holds: basic regis-
tration requirements of any firearm do no harm to the right to keep and bear
arms for self-defense.204
195 Id. at 1253 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26).
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 1253–54 (noting that the following jurisdictions had some form of handgun
registration or other similar system in place: New York in 1911, Illinois in 1881, Georgia in
1910, Oregon in 1917, Michigan in 1927, California in 1917, Hawaii in 1927, and the Dis-
trict of Columbia in 1932).
199 See id. at 1253 (“The Court in Heller considered ‘prohibitions on the possession of
firearms by felons’ to be ‘longstanding’ although states did not start to enact them until
the early [twentieth] century.” (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27)).
200 Id. at 1254.
201 Id. at 1254–55.
202 See id. at 1255.
203 See id. at 1254–55.
204 Indeed, the court acknowledged “[t]he requirement of basic registration as applied
to long guns may also be de minimis,” but was unable to come to a satisfactory conclusion
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For those registration requirements without “longstanding,” historical
precedent, referred to by the court as “novel,” their constitutionality turns on
the level of judicial scrutiny applied.  Plaintiffs sought application of strict
scrutiny because McDonald placed “the right to keep and bear arms among
those fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty,”205
while the District opined such rigorous review “would be inappropriate
because . . . the right to keep and carry arms has always been heavily regu-
lated”; rather, the District would apply a “reasonable-regulation test.”206
Without missing a beat the court rejected the District’s suggestion: “Heller
clearly does reject any kind of ‘rational basis’ or reasonableness test . . . .”207
Although it foreclosed a rational basis standard of review, the Supreme Court
never specified which standard is most appropriate in reviewing gun laws,
thus creating an ambiguity for lower courts to resolve.208
Like the First Amendment, the court reasoned, “the level of scrutiny
applicable under the Second Amendment surely ‘depends on the nature of
the conduct being regulated and the degree to which the challenged law
burdens the right.’”209  This means a firearm restriction “that imposes a sub-
stantial burden upon the core right of self-defense” is unconstitutional absent
“a strong justification,” and laws that impose “less substantial burden[s]”
require less compelling justifications.210  In the end, the court selected inter-
mediate over strict scrutiny because the burden on the right of self-defense,
the core purpose undergirding the Second Amendment right, was simply not
severe enough to merit such exacting review.211  “Indeed, none of the Dis-
trict’s registration requirements prevents an individual from possessing a fire-
arm in his home or elsewhere, whether for self-defense or hunting, or any
other lawful purpose.”212  A law that imposes no restriction on possession of
a firearm, and thus no tangible burden on the right to self-defense, is worthy
only of intermediate scrutiny.
Intermediate scrutiny demands the novel registration requirements
“substantially relate[ ] to an important governmental objective,” and imposes
on the District the burden of making that showing.213  To achieve the
“important or substantial governmental interest,” the registration law must
qualify as “a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective” even
though it need not employ “the least restrictive means.”214  While the District
because of the inadequacies of the record. Id. at 1255 n.**.  The court opted to remand to
the district court to conduct further factfinding with respect to “the application of registra-
tion requirements to long guns.” Id.
205 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778 (2010); Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1256.
206 See Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1256.
207 Id.
208 See id.
209 Id. at 1257 (quoting United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010)).
210 Id.
211 See id. at 1257–58.
212 Id. at 1258.
213 Id. (quoting Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)).
214 Id. (quoting Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-3\NDL310.txt unknown Seq: 26 18-JAN-21 11:53
1372 notre dame law review [vol. 96:3
has put forth the viable government objectives of protecting police officers
and aiding in crime control, the court found the record too incomplete to
determine whether the registration requirements are indeed “substantially
related” to those ends.215  Accordingly, the court remanded “the novel regis-
tration requirements, and all registration requirements as applied to long
guns” for the district court to fill out the record.216
The D.C. Circuit thus found a system of handgun registration to be pre-
sumptively constitutional, and in this case, with no rebuttal to the presump-
tion, ultimately so.217  As to the copious other registration requirements
listed above, the court merely established that a court must review such provi-
sions using intermediate scrutiny but was unable to apply that standard itself
given the state of the evidentiary record.218  In emphatic dicta, however, the
D.C. Circuit at the very least implied that basic registration requirements of
firearms present only a de minimis burden on the right to self-defense.219  A
definite answer as to the burden of a registration requirement for long guns
and the many other technical procedures attendant to registration generally
were once again deferred, but the resolution was not long coming.
B. Application of the Heller Standard: Heller III
After Heller II remanded the case back to the district court, the D.C.
Council effected mostly minor repeals to the registration requirements
intended to “reduce[ ] the burden upon registrants.”220  The district court
upheld the District’s remaining registration obligations as constitutional: (1)
“the basic registration requirement as it pertains to long guns”; (2) the
requirement that the applicant “appear in person to register a firearm and be
fingerprinted and photographed”; (3) the discretionary power of the D.C.
police to compel the applicant to bring in the gun to be registered; (4) “the
expiration of the registration after three years”; (5) registration fees; (6) cer-
tain firearm training and educational requirements; and (7) “the prohibition
on registration of more than one pistol per person in any [thirty]-day
period.”221  Heller on appeal challenged the constitutionality of these regis-
tration requirements.222
The D.C. Circuit in Heller III succinctly explained that in determining
the constitutionality of gun registration laws, a court must apply a two-step
215 See id. at 1258–60.
216 Id. at 1260.
217 See id. at 1253–54.
218 See id. at 1256–60.
219 See id. at 1254–55 (“[B]asic registration requirements are self-evidently de minimis,
for they are similar to other common registration or licensing schemes, such as those for
voting or for driving a car, that cannot reasonably be considered onerous.”).
220 Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller III), 801 F.3d 264, 269 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(repealing, for example, “the requirement that a pistol be submitted for ballistic
identification”).
221 Id. at 270.
222 See id.
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test: “[A]sk first whether [the law] impinges upon a right protected by the
Second Amendment,” and if so, then ask whether the law survives intermedi-
ate scrutiny.223  Under that standard of review, the District must show the law
“promotes a substantial governmental interest that would be achieved less
effectively absent the regulation”224 and that “the harms to be prevented” by
the law “are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact
alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.”225  Once the District suc-
cessfully makes this showing, it must also demonstrate “the means chosen are
not substantially broader than necessary to achieve that interest.”226
1. Long Gun Registration Requirement
The court without hesitation found “the burden of the basic registration
requirement as applied to long guns is de minimis,” and therefore concluded
“it does not implicate the second amendment right.”227  This means that the
D.C. Circuit declared basic registration requirements as applied to both
handguns and long guns were not merely constitutional, but in fact did not
even implicate any meaningful burden on the Second Amendment right.
Whether federal or state, a law that merely requires the registration of a gun
via the collection of a modest amount of information about the registrant
and the gun carries with it the strong presumption of constitutionality.
Straightforward firearm registration requirements present no burden on the
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.
2. Particular Firearm Registration Requirements Under Intermediate
Scrutiny
The other registration requirements were admittedly not de minimis,
and thus had to survive an analysis under the intermediate scrutiny frame-
work.228  As identified in Heller II,229 the District proffered two substantial
state interests served by the registration requirements: protecting police
officers and promoting public safety.230  The court rejected the notion that
the registration requirements actually protected police officers as they
responded to calls because the police very rarely check the registration
records.231  Additionally, since police officers regularly exercise high caution
when responding to a crime or other like incident, the fact that the gun
registry may provide knowledge about the potentiality for a weapon seems
223 Id. at 272 (quoting Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1252).
224 Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 782–83 (1989)).
225 Id. at 272–73 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994)).
226 Id. at 272 (quoting Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 782–83).
227 Id. at 273–74 (citing Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1254–55).
228 See id. at 274.
229 670 F.3d at 1258.
230 Heller III, 801 F.3d at 274.
231 See id. at 275.
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unlikely to greatly advance officer safety.232  The District next claimed its fire-
arm registration requirements promote public safety by “distinguishing
criminals from law-abiding citizens, enabling police to arrest criminals imme-
diately, facilitating enforcement against prohibited persons obtaining or con-
tinuing to possess firearms, reducing gun trafficking, and increasing the
difficulty for criminals to acquire guns.”233  The court then set about decid-
ing if the registration provisions at issue would, “in a direct and material
way,”234 further the substantial state interest in public safety.235
a. In-person Fingerprinting and Photographing
The District requires each applicant to “appear in person to register a
firearm and be fingerprinted and photographed.”236  These requirements
further the substantial state interest of public safety “by facilitating identifica-
tion of a gun’s owner” at two crucial stages: “at the time of registration” and
during later police checks of a gun’s registration.237
At the first stage, the District contended its fingerprinting requirement is
essential to ensure firearm registrants are qualified to possess a gun.238  Back-
ground checks that employ identification solely by name and social security
number are “more susceptible to fraud” than ones that use identification by
fingerprinting.239  The District demonstrated the danger of background
checks conducted using only limited identification information by highlight-
ing a U.S. Government Accountability Office report in which undercover
agents were “without exception” able to obtain firearms using false identities
even after undergoing a NICS check.240  Felons and others prohibited from
owning a gun may easily thwart the background check system absent some
greater means of identification on the front end.  Given this danger, and
even without a showing that such loopholes are actually exploited, mandat-
ing fingerprinting as a “prophylactic” measure is constitutional because it will
“help to deter and detect fraud and thereby prevent disqualified individuals
from registering firearms.”241
At the second stage, the District posits its photographing requirement is
helpful “when the police encounter an armed registrant” by allowing the
authorities to “quickly identify whether and to whom the firearm has been
legally registered.”242  This can help diffuse a situation and thereby support
232 See id.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 272–73 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 664).
235 See id. at 275.
236 Id. at 270.
237 Id. at 275.
238 See id. at 275–76.
239 See id. at 276.
240 Id.; see Fake IDs Used to Buy Guns, CBS NEWS (Mar. 21, 2001), https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/fake-ids-used-to-buy-guns/.
241 Heller III, 801 F.3d at 276.
242 Id.
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the safety of the officer, the suspect, and the public at large.  Because it pro-
motes the public safety in this way, the court deemed the requirement to
photograph firearm registrants constitutional.243
Requiring the registrant to show up in person at the police department
is also constitutional because it is merely a necessary corollary to the other
lawful registration requirements.244  In sum, the basic ability to reliably iden-
tify gun owners through fingerprinting and photographing adequately pro-
motes the public safety to render such registration requirements
constitutional.
b. Discretionary Power of the D.C. Police to Require Bringing in the
Firearm
The District reserved to itself the discretionary power to compel a fire-
arm registrant to bring the gun to be registered into the police station.245  It
posited that such a requirement would promote the public safety by verifying
that the gun’s information aligns with that on the registration certificate,
guaranteeing “the firearm has not been altered or switched with another fire-
arm.”246  The court was not persuaded by this rationale and found it unlikely
that someone would go to the trouble of obtaining a registration certificate
for a weapon other than the one in his possession.247  Even more than failing
to promote the public safety, requiring a registrant to bring a gun into the
police station may actually jeopardize the public safety because of the risk the
gun may be stolen or mistaken as a threat to police.248  The discretionary
authority to compel a firearm registrant to present the gun to the police does
not facilitate public safety, and for that reason this registration requirement
is unconstitutional.
c. Triennial Reregistration Requirement
The District also mandated firearm registrants reregister their guns
every three years.249  It argued this requirement was useful to check that the
registrant had not become disqualified from gun ownership, maintain an
updated registration database, and verify that registrants know “the wherea-
bouts of their firearms.”250  The court dismantled all three justifications in
turn.  First, the court noted the District could uncover a gun owner’s disqual-
ifications without causing their registration to expire; the District could sim-
ply conduct background checks.251  Second, while acknowledging the
243 See id. at 276–77.
244 Id. at 277.
245 See id. at 270.
246 See id. at 277.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 See id. at 270.
250 Id. at 277–78.
251 Id. at 277.
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reregistration requirement may help maintain the registry database, it is
unnecessary to “burden[ ] every gun owner” because “there is already a
requirement that gun owners report relevant changes in their informa-
tion.”252  Third, the reregistration requirement is redundant because
another District law already directs gun owners to report their lost or stolen
firearms.253
Whether the court would reach the same result absent the other District
laws is uncertain, but here the triennial reregistration requirement does not
sufficiently promote public safety to justify the burden placed on gun owners.
With these facts, then, the reregistration requirement was held
unconstitutional.
d. Registration Fees
The court upheld the constitutionality of a firearm registration fee with
a simple reference to its prior holding in Heller II: administrative procedures
involved in registering a gun, like charging “reasonable fees . . . are lawful
insofar as the underlying regime is lawful.”254  Because the court previously
found the underlying basic firearm registration requirements to be constitu-
tional,255 a reasonable fee incidental to that registration process must also be
constitutional.
e. Firearm Education and Training Requirements
The District also imposed requirements “that a registrant complete a
firearms safety and training course . . . and that the registrant pass a test to
demonstrate his knowledge of the District’s firearms laws.”256  The court
reached different outcomes on whether each actually promotes the public
safety.
The court found the one-hour firearms safety and training course consti-
tutional because of the value of training in preventing accidental injury or
death.257  The court was satisfied with this inferential step not because of any
report cited by the District, but rather because the confluence of “history,
consensus, and simple common sense” inspired confidence in the proposi-
tion that firearm training leads to fewer firearm-related accidents.258
The same could not be said of the test of the District’s firearms laws.
The District provided no evidence linking knowledge of the law to interest in
252 Id. at 278.
253 Id.
254 Id. (quoting Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1249 n.* (D.C.
Cir. 2011)).
255 See id. at 273–74 (citing Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1254–55) (finding “the burden of the
basic registration requirement as applied to long guns,” like that applied to handguns, to
be “de minimis” and therefore constitutional).
256 Id. at 270.
257 Id. at 279.
258 Id. (quoting Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001)).
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public safety, and, in fact, many of the questions on the test were unrelated to
public safety.259  The additional burden on the Second Amendment right in
requiring passage of this test was thus not supported by evidence tending to
show it would increase the safety of the public, so the court deemed it
unconstitutional.260
f. One-Pistol-Per-Month Rule
Finally, the District prohibited the “registration of more than one pistol
per person in any [thirty]-day period.”261  It reasoned that restricting the
number of guns one person could register would “reduce gun trafficking”
and generally promote public safety by reducing the number of guns in cir-
culation.262  The court was underwhelmed by the District’s scarce evidence in
support of its argument that limiting the number of guns a person could
register would reduce gun trafficking.263  On the public safety front, the
court noted that even if fewer guns made for less gun violence, it emphati-
cally concluded that such a rationale “does not justify restricting an individ-
ual’s undoubted constitutional right to keep arms (plural) in his or her
home.”264  Seeing as the limit on the number of guns a person could register
within a certain time period bore no great connection to the rationale of
protecting the public, such a burden on the Second Amendment right was
therefore unconstitutional.265
To summarize, the court in Heller III upheld as constitutional the finger-
printing and photographing requirements, reasonable firearm registration
fees, and the mandatory firearms safety and training course.  Though these
prerequisites to registering, and thus lawfully possessing, a firearm burdened
the Second Amendment right, their concurrent promotion of the public
safety justified the burden.  The court struck down as unconstitutional the
ability of the D.C. police to force registrants to bring in their weapons, the
triennial reregistration requirement, the test of registrants’ knowledge of
D.C. gun laws, and the limiting of firearm registration to one per every thirty-
day period.  These conditions on registering firearms burdened the Second
Amendment right without adequate promotion of the public safety, and they
were thus adjudged unconstitutional.
As the Supreme Court unambiguously declared in Heller, “the right
secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.”266  When examining
the constitutionality of laws touching on gun possession, the proper analysis
is to determine the extent of the burden imposed on the right to keep and
bear arms.  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found in Heller II and III that
259 See id.
260 See id.
261 Id. at 270.




266 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
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basic registration requirements, applied to both handguns and long guns, so
insignificantly burden the right to possess a firearm that such laws need not
undergo intermediate scrutiny.267  Registration requirements on top of the
baseline collection of personal and weapon information, however, as dis-
cussed in detail in Heller III, are likely more than a de minimis burden on the
Second Amendment right but can still be constitutional if supported by evi-
dence tying the law to the promotion of public safety.
The Supreme Court has never directly decided whether a firearm regis-
tration requirement is constitutional under the Second Amendment.  Were
its analysis to look at all like the D.C. Circuit’s, though, the fundamental
aspects of a federal firearm registration law would be convincingly upheld.
CONCLUSION
Gun violence is ubiquitous in the United States.  For those living in our
country’s most dangerous corners, fear of gun violence is ingrained and nor-
malized.268  For all Americans, the seeming prevalence and random nature
of mass shootings instills a tangible fear of otherwise mundane public spaces
like malls, schools, and movie theaters.269  For those directly harmed, the
consequences can be severe and sometimes fatal.  In light of the enormous
but perhaps unknowable extent of the damage inflicted by gun violence, a
legislative fix is badly needed.
A federal firearm registration system may not be the natural first choice
when legislating for gun violence prevention.  It would inevitably provoke
spirited opposition, likely facing criticism that it only enlarges the bureau-
cracy and amounts to governmental overreach.  At its base, though, firearm
registration is a simple, nonintrusive means for the national government to
account for the number and type of guns owned, and to keep persons pro-
hibited from gun ownership from acquiring them.  It consists of data collec-
tion, storage, and analysis, and it in no way restricts the ability of those with
the right to own a firearm from doing so.  And while a national gun registry is
not on its own a comprehensive way to reduce gun violence, it works well in
tandem with other gun safety policies.  For example, a gun registry would
bolster the efficacy of background checks on firearm purchasers by providing
267 See Heller III, 801 F.3d at 273–74 (citing Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670
F.3d 1244, 1254–55 (D.C. Cir. 2011)) (finding “the burden of the basic registration
requirement as applied to long guns,” like that applied to handguns, to be “de minimis”
and therefore constitutional).
268 See, e.g., Krishnadev Calamur, The Normalization of Gun Violence in Poor Communities,
THE ATLANTIC (June 24, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2018/06/
gun-violence/563582/ (“If you realized that there was a child that had to go to bed to the
sound of gunfire, wake up to the sound of gunfire, maybe walk across yellow tape on the
way to school, I think we would think about this issue very differently.”).
269 See One-Third of US Adults Say Fear of Mass Shootings Prevents Them from Going to Certain
Places or Events, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.apa.org/news/press/
releases/2019/08/fear-mass-shooting (highlighting a survey finding “[a] large majority of
adults in the United States are stressed by mass shootings”).
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more complete and accurate information than would otherwise be available,
thereby successfully screening out those ineligible to possess a firearm.  It
would also aid police in crimefighting by allowing them to more efficiently
track down crime guns and their registered owners.  Together with other pol-
icy measures, a federal firearm registration system could effectively mitigate
gun violence without infringing on the liberty of Americans to lawfully pos-
sess firearms.
The federal government, though expressly hostile to general firearm
registration requirements,270 currently operates a successful registration sys-
tem for certain kinds of dangerous weapons, such as machine guns.271  NICS
background checks also involve the collection, albeit not the storage, of
information on potential gun purchasers and the guns they seek to buy.272
Congress should transition to a system of universal required firearm registra-
tion simply by expanding NICS to cover all firearm transfers and inputting
the information obtained from the ATF Form 4473s into the federal firearm
registry, then retaining them indefinitely.  The NRA itself highlighted this as
a feasible method of implementing a firearm registry through NICS, where
the registration of all firearm transfers would eventually result in a compre-
hensive gun registry.273  Establishing a federal firearm registry through NICS
would be simple and familiar, and thus less prone to missteps.
Existing systems of gun registration present a picture of what a fully real-
ized federal policy could accomplish.  Washington, D.C., Hawaii, and Califor-
nia, for example, employ universal firearm registration requirements
applicable to all guns.274  Once a registration system has been established on
the federal level, it should thereafter operate like those state-level systems,
which require the registration of all new guns and of all firearms transferred.
Laws regulating firearms violate the Second Amendment when they too
greatly burden the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.275  In apply-
ing this principle to existing systems of gun registration, the D.C. Circuit
found that if basic gun registration requirements pose any burden on the
Second Amendment right, such burden is de minimis, and they are therefore
presumptively constitutional.276  Requirements that posed a greater burden
on gun possession faced more intense judicial scrutiny, but were still found
constitutional if closely enough related to the promotion of public safety.277
270 See supra text accompanying notes 1–4.
271 See supra text accompanying notes 24–41 for a discussion of the National Firearms
Act of 1934 and its subsequent amendments by the Gun Control Act of 1968 and the
Firearm Owners’ Protection Act of 1986.
272 See supra text accompanying notes 42–65.
273 See supra text accompanying note 21.
274 See supra text accompanying notes 66–133.
275 See supra text accompanying notes 134–90.
276 See Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1254–55 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (“[B]asic registration requirements are self-evidently de minimis, for they are similar
to other common registration or licensing schemes, such as those for voting or for driving
a car, that cannot reasonably be considered onerous.”).
277 See supra text accompanying notes 228–66.
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The Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms runs deep in American
culture and is fundamental to a great number in this country.  Mandatory
registration of firearms does not impinge on that right.
Of course, the Founding Fathers could never have envisioned a federal
gun registration system.  Neither could they have imagined that bullets and
guns would cause so much irreversible devastation.  They could not have
fathomed that even after centuries of relative stability, peace, and economic
prosperity, the citizens of the country they built continue to live in legitimate
fear of the bullet of a compatriot.  Surely, in light of the recurring tragedies
wrought by gun violence, our Founders would not sit idly by and accept such
a status quo as preordained, a symptom inevitably concomitant with the lib-
erty recognized by the Second Amendment.  None would sanction inaction,
and neither should Americans today.  Without infringing on the right to
keep and bear arms, and even without altering the Supreme Court’s interpre-
tation of that right, bold and meaningful changes to our nation’s gun policy
can be adopted.  And if we sincerely hope to stem gun violence in the United
States, a system of gun registration is a sensible first step.
